Marketing Memos

Oracle, as always, has a good game plan, though they have not thought out everything under the Sun.

I attended Oracle’s outbound communication extravaganza concerning the completed swallowing of Sun.  In the time from initial purchase to the final approvable by European Union regulators, Oracle has been busy deciding what parts of Sun to keep (pretty much everything), how to integrate to company (interestingly) and where to create real market value (specific).  In an event short on surprises – unless Larry did something quirky, which I missed by having to leave early – OraSun changes the game, which is the entire point of marketing.

Aside from seeing “Sun” positioned over “Oracle” on all the event branding (the last time this will undoubtedly occur), the basic market strategy of the merger can be summarized as “We are your IT hub, we are specializing the center of your operations, and don’t look at that man behind the curtain labeled ‘cloud computing’.”

The first and recurring OraSun gestalt was that Ellison owns a stack, from iron to apps.  They are not kidding either.  Ignoring technology religion, Oracle now provides a solution for servers, storage, virtualization, middleware, databases, applications and the management of the two major strata (systems/apps).  They may have nothing in the networking realm, but they will next year when Oracle buys Cisco (that was a joke, but I heard you gasp).

This is an interesting turn of events.  As one OraSun exec noted, the IBM of the 1960’s offered head-to-toe solutions, insinuating that Oracle was the IBM of the new millennia.  Given how close to financial death IBM came to in the 1980s, we should add an Outlook entry for 2030 and retake Oracle’s financial pulse.

History is its own recycling bin.

OraSun’s marketing strategy is to be one-throat-to-choke for the hub of datacenters.  They rightly recognize that mission critical work is both ill-suited to cloud computing and that by tightly cross-tuning the OraSun stack, they will create a market domineering solution set.  Much of OraSun’s presentation spun tales of how the database, Solaris, SPARC and flash-enhanced storage are being co-designed.  The end goal is to assure that the OraSun stack is inarguably the most technologically effective data hub.  HP can’t compete as their Itanium solution is rapidly evaporating and their database offering almost isn’t.  IBM has a shot, but with fat margins in services, declining acceptance of DB2 and a post-Gerstner reluctance to centralize authority, they likely will not challenge the throne.

OraSun positioned themselves very well.

Oracle’s (wo)men in black – black suits and white shirts were the corporate executive uniform – repeated the manta of removing the systems integration task from the datacenter.  Oracle’s messaging was pointed like a revolver at CIOs and CTOs, claiming that systems integration is a major headache for these folks and that no other vendor offers all integrated points.  Granted, Oracle artfully ignored some plumbing products necessary to even a data hub (routers and network management), but their point was compelling assuming that the top of the stack – applications – met customer needs.

One OraSun spokesperson was somewhat defensive on the subject of cloud computing.  Obviously Oracle understands the issue and also understands that they do not have a clear market advantage at present.  He struggled with the concept of saying “grid” computing is “cloud” computing before tossing up a hit-piece slide on VMWare, which does own the cloud space.  For now it will be an uncomfortable stare-down:  OraSun is willing to own and dominate the hub of the data center on specialized Sun hardware, and let VMWare handle less-critical cloud computing with generic hardware.

For now.

Since OraSun gives away virtual machine solutions, they have the ability to buy cloud management tools that lost to VMWare and integrate those into OraSun systems management utilities.  After Sun is completely integrated into Oracle and together they dominate the datacenter hubs, expect Larry’s Legions to make a cloud play.  The market exists, is important, complements OraSun’s virtual desktop products, and is acquirable.  OraSun is merely talking-it-down for the moment.

Heads-up VMWare:  Larry will gun for you next.

The prelude is a hiring binge.  OraSun is vacuuming the salesperson market and adding 2,000 head to their global sales squad.  Ellison understands his “unified stack” position in the market is unique but not impenetrable.  Alliances will be formed and cloud computing offers some alternatives to raw central-server and grid approaches.  OraSun’s mission is to move as many customers to their combined solution as quickly as they can, because the switching cost of disengaging from a stack as complete as OraSun’s will be huge.  Lock-em’ in rapidly while working out the cloud initiative, then dominate the remainder of the datacenter market.

OraSun’s wildcard was not as wild as expected.  No real news was released about MySQL aside from OraSun integrating controls for their infrastructure management tools into the almost universally popular and largely free DBMS.  This is less of a commitment than a loss leader.  MySQL has invaded the enterprise in much the same way as Linux did.  It is not ready to be in the mission-critical hub, but it needs to be managed more effectively than most current tools permit.  By adding MySQL to the OraSun infrastructure management suite, Oracle is blocking alternatives and thus avenues of escape for customers.

From a marketing standpoint, Oracle shows once again that old lessons should not be ignored.  They have taken the enduring one-throat-to-choke market demand and amplified it.  CIOs – aside from the rightfully paranoid ones – will be hard-pressed to argue against adopting Oracle.  Marketing is first and foremost about identifying and satisfying needs, and OraSun is aggressively doing just that.

Let’s see if the scheme works.  Oracle likes buying successful companies, but Sun was nearing fiscal death when Larry swept in.  Larry’s also trying to buy one of the worst basketball teams on the planet, so maybe he has simply run out of good investments.

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Apple is pushing people to populate their phones with installed applications while Google, IBM and Microsoft are urging folk to remove apps from desktops.

This is not nearly bizarre as it sounds.

The success of Apple Apps for iPhones is slightly more phenomenal than the second coming. The universe seems consumed by the desire to have useful and useless apps installed onto their handsets. Sure, most of the iPhone app rush comes from the rush of playing with a new toy, proving once again the only difference between men and boys is the price of their data plan.

Yet this month shows that the desktop is slowing turning into little more than a SaaS suckling tool, whereby apps are delivered online. Google may have led the pack with early availability of desktop apps-on-tap, but now IBM and Microsoft have tap danced onto the stage.

(The mental visual of Steve Balmer and Sam Palmisano doing a vaudeville soft-shoe act is highly amusing)

IBM’s offering seems to offer what the market would seriously not consider. Big Blue and Ubuntu (say that ten times real fast) have teamed to push applications from a Linux cloud to a Linux desktop via a Lotus leaf. Ignoring the narrow niche of combined technologies, the requisite once-and-future Linux desktop is a momentum killer. Swapping XP for Windows7 will be hideously painful, but slightly less so than a migration to a completely new desktop OS and application package.

Which is unimportant. $3 per user per month is the real news story.

Marketing clouds parted when the rental cost of the solution set was mentioned. Good, bad or indifferent, SaaS apps have caught the attention of application vendors for a number of reasons, the most motivating of which is that steady, predictable revenues streams are far preferable to the old model. Sure, support revenues were the underlying motivation for many software plays, but the agony of product release and upgrade support programs coupled with associated spikes in revenues and expenses made maddening money flows.

Which is one reason Microsoft is chasing the same market.

Though unavailable until next years Office 2010 release, Microsoft is readying a web version of Office. Though pricing and options are not yet known, Microsoft has in the past licensed server-side solutions in creative ways (for example, many ISPs supply SharePoint on a per head rental basis). If Microsoft’s web apps are sufficiently adept, many enterprises might opt for the technical and budgetary convenience of serving applications via a browser than installing every bit on every lap-and-desktop in an organization. Microsoft would certainly approve of monthly/quarterly/annual rental fees since a steady flow of greenbacks makes wallpapering Bill Gate’s den a simpler process.

The question is if enterprises will bite.

Part of technology marketing is knowing how IT technoids work, or would work if they had the nerve to assassinate their end users. After costs considerations are sacrificed, IT’s primary motivation is pain avoidance. The two greatest sources of pain for IT staffs are end user stability and systems stability. Ignoring that no end user is mentally stable, the topic turns to their computing environment stability. Web sourced apps have a number of end user stability advantages, including the inability for end users to augment the program with unlicensed software (a.k.a. malware) and the uniformity of having all users executing the same program and revision.

There will be fewer bald and bleary-eyed IT admins if web apps become the norm.

But no enterprise shop can go 100% web application. One Forrester Research analyst noted that “Our own research shows that a good portion of information workers rarely use all of the tools in their Office arsenal.” True, but there are power users and road warriors aplenty, and they likely can/will not switch to web apps. Web office applications are (likely) less feature soaked than their binary buddies, but are unlikely executable from a back seat somewhere between Baoji and Baoshan.

This creates a conundrum. Since enterprises have invested mega money into desk-lap-top maintenance systems, would they double their drudgery in order to rent apps? Since upgrade cycles for lap-desk-flat-top applications is about five years, and that the average upgrade cost for a bulk buyer of Microsoft Office suites is around $150, the breakeven costs (ignoring maintenance infrastructure and ulcer medications) is about $2.50 a month per user.

Which is where IBM got their $3/head price.

Web hosted applications may be the wave of the future, but current moment will retard any inevitability. There is a lack of marketing connection at play – a lack of urgency, a dearth of desirability, and a shortage of savings.

It is insane to declare web apps DOA, but one wonders why outfits like IBM and Microsoft sense getting products to market is necessary. I think their main motivation may be less demonstrated enterprise demand and more Google’s goading.

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Lock-in as a marketing strategy is alive, well, and unfortunately growing.

For dot-communists and those raised in the era of Linux, vendor lock-in is the art of keeping customers captive. By making people commit to a technology, and thus raising the pain of switching away from said technology, vendors cause customers to linger even when they do not want to. I know CIOs who for decades have blustered against Cognos and being locked into stiff annual license fees for PowerHouse, Cognos’ ancient 4GL.

Yet they pay the fee every year knowing that rewriting thousands of lines of PowerHouse code is pretty pricy too.

Another variation of vendor lock-in is commonly called upgrade robbery. I encountered such a scam this week when I noticed my ancient (circa 2003) smartphone buttons started to stick. In order to upgrade to a newer smartphone, AT&T insists that I buy $720 worth of wireless data that I do not need or want. My options are to switch carriers (who currently require the same data plans), or buy an unlocked phone for which AT&T may or may not automatically add a data plan for using. More maniacal still is that mandatory data plans are designed to condition cellular subscribers into using data services. Thus, at the end of a two year data engagement, the luxury of wireless data will have become and necessity.

Pretty pricy phones.

Amazon also has a bit of a lock-in with their popular Kindle ebook reader, though their version of lock-in is somewhat friendlier. The data format for Kindle books is proprietary, and Amazon is in no hurry to openly license the format to competing hardware makers. Buying an Amazon ebook means only owning Kindles for reading it, which if you are a typical bibliophile or literary pack rat means you have one and only one upgrade and replacement path – Amazon lock-in.

Pretty pricy e-paper.

Oddly, lock-in rarely lives long, with Cognos being an obvious exception. Customer lock-in is a strategy that invites competition, either with competing proprietary products, or more insidiously with open technology. Just ask Steve Balmer if Linux has caused Microsoft any problems in the market (and if you want to see Steve toss another chair, ask him if Vista caused Microsoft any problems in the market).

Already we see cracks in the each of the lock-in strategies. AT&T and their enabler Apple are repeatedly prodding Google to go nuclear, and recent rumors indicate Google may break the upgrade lock-in mechanism. Google is allegedly entering the hardware business and launching their own phones, to be available unlocked and at retail. Since G-phones are just as slick as iPhones, and since their open source souls allow for a broader range of potential applications, this is a market changing event. In the short term AT&T, Verizon and other lock-in experts will likely gouge customers slipping an unlocked G-phone onto their networks.

And that will be a mistake.

Smaller and hungrier carriers have already adjusted their voice plans to compete with the confusing and costly packages offered by the likes of AT&T and Verizon. Smaller carriers already offer flat-rate, unlimited voice plans and are earning sufficient revenues to expand their coverage maps (the chief differentiator of the major carriers). With over 70 GSM carriers in the U.S., the potential for competition is huge – vendor lock-in is thus a poor long term strategy.

This is where Google aggravates this situation. Currently, unlocked phones are a small business (albeit growing). Amazon sells unlocked phones, but has a special FAQ page due to the confusion factor and a general lack of iPhone-level lust for unlocked gizmos. A Google phone on Wal-Mart shelves with Google-simple instructions for swapping SIM cards will change the demand side of the equation. This will help the smaller carriers and tempt one of the major carriers to drop the data plan requirement.

Likewise, Barnes and Noble is teaming up with Adobe to promote open standards in ebook data formats, directly attacking Amazon’s Kindle lock-in and opening the ebook reader market to manufactures everywhere.

So when should a vendor employ a lock-in strategy? It depends on how much of your soul you are willing to give the Devil, but it does have a place in growth strategies. In new markets where you are taking large risks by inventing and promoting new product concepts, lock-in may be necessary to temporarily forestall competition and to guarantee some degree of recurring revenue. Amazon’s Kindle is a good example. Though not a new concept, Amazon was attempting to popularize ebooks and needed to assure that consumers would come to Amazon to buy the books as well as the reader. Publishers also need some assurance that the market would not be confused by too many products spread over too many vendors.

But lock-in is short lived – aside from mainframes and Cognos PowerHouse – and should not be a strategy on which to pin all future hopes. Amazon should have moved toward an open document format with the Kindle II, which in the short run would have cannibalized hardware sales while solidifying Amazon as the place for ebooks and growing the ebook market.

I’d have more to say, but I want to spend some time browsing unlocked phones on Amazon.

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“Bottoms up” is not just something you say during cocktail hour or at a strip club. It is a market strategy as well, and Google will implement it with a fist full of dollar bills.

News of a Google netbook operating system – Chrome OS by name – has emerged. Targeted for netbooks running ARM and x86 chips, COS centers Google’s Chrome browser as the interface to the world and to Google applications. This latest Linux distro is designed to address the bottom of the commercial computing market (we’ll ignore the One Laptop per Child gizmos that would otherwise win the Barrel Bottom Scraper Award for underpowered PCs).

Scott McNealy understood half the equation when in an over-caffeinated frenzy said “The network is the computer.” Naturally McNealy saw the hardware side of the system, being that he was in the hardware business. But as any technology marketing maven will maintain, it is the apps that sell the hardware.

Google is all about the apps.

Restate McNealy’s maxim for software and you get “The Internet is the app.” Google search is arguably the most popular app on the Internet. Their desktop applications … not so much, but for low-end users they are plenty.

Low-end users like netbook buyers.

Now that Google apps (Docs, Gmail, Maps, etc.) can operate offline, and given that Google’s browser can be tweaked to enhance these offline apps, Google has all the components for customer lock-in or delight, depending on how un-evil Google really is. Non-power users who want a computer for the most mundane uses – people for who Open Office is overkill – could easily exist using Chrome OS, Chrome Browser and G-apps. This is probably 80% of the market.

I’ll take an 80% segment any day.

The open marketing question is “what hardware vendors would ever use COS?” Industry analysts assess the low end Microsoft tax on netbooks to be about $20 a unit when XP is deployed, or about 7% of the cost of the cheapest netbook available today at CompUSA. $20 may not sound like a lot to you or me because it is a one-time cost. Some industry estimators expect 35 million of the little laptops to be built this year. The Microsoft tax would rack-up nearly three quarters of a billion dollars, which is serious money to hardware vendors or anyone outside of the Obama administration.

Smart money is betting that Google will ask only a nominal, fixed partner fee for joining the COS party. Pay a few grand to gain access and your hardware company is alleviated of the Microsoft tax. Assuming that the brand of operating system is irrelevant to the average netbook buyer, netbook builders are looking at a few extra million dollars a year to pad their 201Ks (which were 401Ks before the recession).

Google’s goal then becomes monetizing the user, not the OS. Tech pundits predict that advertising will be Google’s approach. This may well be. The evil half of my brain (which in full disclosure actually occupies more than half my cranium) sees a million ways of inflicting advertising on unwary netbook buyers. Most methods however are intrusive, unwelcome and exactly what Google will not do. Chrome will not force people to endure Google ad pop-ups, or permanently scrolling banners on the top of the screen (besides, netbook screens are too small to waste on banner space).

Brand and first choice in external interactions is where Google gains, advertising revenues following online. Google is creating a 100% Google environment and a go-to brand. When netbook users wake in the morning, their lives will revolve around the Google OS. Add Google browser, add Google desktop applications, add Google search (built into everything), ad nausium. It is a completely interconnected and Internet driven brand. Microsoft came close to this when indoctrinated info workers adopted Microsoft Office atop a Microsoft OS.

It was Microsoft’s overriding strategy that both gives Google opportunity and may require Google to cede it.

The question is if Google must open the OS in order to compete. For all Microsoft’s faults (a list that is slightly longer than War and Peace and a Hugo Chavez speech combined) it understood that the application sells everything else. The network is the computer, the Internet is the app, the app is everything. When there is a market leading application, Microsoft supports it then clones it. Microsoft has always entertained, encouraged and even funded developers to assure that the next great app – whatever it may be – will be under development somewhere. Microsoft always wants the Next Big Thing to run on Windows first.

If Google closes COS, it will enjoy only limited market penetration. People slightly more advanced than monkeys – anyone who has not created permanent couch indentations – will eventually want to do something on their netbook that Google has not provided. Google’s desktop toolbar is not a digital Darwinian ecosystem. Gadgets are insufficient. Google will open COS in order to expand.

Just don’t expect it in version 1.x. Google knows not to invite unnecessary heat, and will keep COS locked while it matures and takes complete ownership of the low end of the market. After that beachhead is secure, they will open, expand and become a serious threat to Microsoft.

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It is always fun to see a market tipping point at the moment it occurs.

Samsung, the Korean tech titan, is rumored to be exiting the hard drive business for ultra thin notebooks, switching instead to solid state drive (SDD) production. It appears that Hitachi, Fujitsu, Seagate and Western Digital have abandoned that market as well, leaving Toshiba alone to peddle electricity sucking spindles for your groin warmer.

When five out of six primary players leave a market, you know that market is toast.

Intel is accelerating the switch. They report that as soon as next month they will double the density of their SSDs, pumping in a hefty 160GB into the small form factor. Since SSDs are a relatively new market phenomenon, and since work has only begun on how to bundle more bits into the drives, we can expect Moore’s law to switch from CPU cycles to SSD saturation.

Amazingly, this is occurring without a single dollar of Federal stimulus money.

Markets change and technology markets change fast enough to make blinking a hazard. Given the inherent advantages to SSDs for laptop users, and the gurgling price/capacity wars, we can expect most new business laptops to come with SSDs within a year or two, and most new consumer laptops soon thereafter.

With markets changing at that speed, marketers have an added headache, namely calling the point for abandoning old technology. It is never easy to decide when to abandon a market or strategy, but it is part of the CMOs role. In the technology business it takes gamblers’ nerves. Exit too soon and you leave behind a viable cash stream. Switch too late and you are on the bottom of the compost heap in terms of market share and revenues.

The primary indicator to making this decision is when a new solution set presents customers with one or more benefits while eliminating former deficits. Laptops now outsell desktops and that gap will widen rapidly. When laptops were twice the price (or half the performance) of desktops, only road warriors and people who enjoyed typing with pencil erasers would own one. When the price/performance gap between laptops and desktops became more or less none, buyers started switching. The new benefit (having your computing power wherever you went) was important and the old deficit (high price or low performance) went away.

Sure, this sounds basic, but how many CMOs include this criterion on their monthly product line review check list? Fewer than presidential cabinet members with tax problems (well, that’s unfair … there are way too many of the latter).

SSDs are now following laptops, figuratively and literally. The new benefits are significant – less battery drain, less fragile, more reliable and cooler on your private parts. The only deficits – price and capacity – are falling fast. Thus we are at the edge of a market demand shift.

Now, if Intel or Samsung would thank me for pointing out their advanced thinking by sending me an SSD for my HP 6530b laptop …

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